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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I 
DUANE SOUTH,VICK, . 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ! 
vs. 
S. S. -MULLEN, INC., A 'Vashington ) 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
No. 
10797 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
STATEl\1ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff for personal 
injuries received while viewing the demolition of Still-
man Bridge conducted by defendant. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court sitting with a 
jury. From a verdict of No Cause of Action and judg-
ment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for 
injuries received when he was hit on the left wrist by 
debris from demolition of Stillman Bridge at approxi-
mately 4:10 P.M. on the 29th day of November, 1963. 
Plaintiff alleged that defendant conducted said demo-
lition and that at the time and place it "was solely in 
control of and responsible for operating a dangerous 
instrumentality, to wit: In using explosives for blasting 
work; that defendant is absolutely liable to plaintiff ' 
for injuries resulting from said use of said dangerous 
instrumentality." (R.1-3). 
Plaintiff was viewing the demolition of Stillman 
Bridge as a newsman employed by KCPX Television, 
assigned to take moving pictures of said demolition. 
(R.249, 250). Plaintiff had been employed as a news-
man for approximately five months prior to the incident 
in question. ( R. 249) . This was the first blasting opera-
tion covered by plaintiff, and he testified that he had 
2 
never had any training or experience in blasting prior 
to this assignment. ( R.250). 
Plaintiff and two other newsmen, Mike Miller and 
.J etf Jordan, at the time of the blast were located in 
the vicinity of two automobiles which were parked up 
an incline, the station wagon facing down the incline, 
and the other automobile facing up the incline on the 
north side of the canyon, nearly due west from Stillman 
Bridge. (Ex. P-2) . The estimated distance of said 
newsmen from Stillman Bridge varied according to the 
testimony of plaintiff's witnesses from 300 to 400 yards. 
( R. 198, 229, 255, 256) . 
Jeff Jordan and Mike .Miller arrived at the scene 
of the blast earlier than did plaintiff. They testified 
that they came earlier for the purpose of conducting 
a taped interview with the powder foreman, which 
proved to be unsuccessful on account of a breakdown 
in equipment. (R. 196). After the interview proved 
unsuccessful, Jeff Jordan and Mike Miller proceeded 
to the area near the shack, estimated to be approxi-
mately 200 yards due west of the bridge. ( R. 256). 
The shack was where the detonation of the charge was 
made by Don Noe, one of the assistants on the job, 
and also where at least one other newsman stayed to 
attempt to get pictures of the blast. The testimony of 
.T etf Jordan and :Mike Miller was that both at the time 
of the unsuccessful interview in the vicinity of the 
bridge and later in the vicinity of the shack there were 
<liscussions held between them and other newsmen and 
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the powder foreman as to the procedure to be followed. 
At the conversation near the shack, both Jordan and 
Miller testified that they were informed that the area 
close to the shack was unsafe, whereupon they made 
inquiry concerning a specific location some 150 yards 
farther west from the shack and were informed by the 
powder foreman that this was all right, at which time 
they then took their station wagon to this place. ( R. 
197, 228). 
There was no evidence disputing plaintiff's testi-
mony that he was not present at the conferences held at 
the bridge and the shack with the powder foreman. The 
only person he talked to before arriving at the scene 
was Chauncey Powis, the representative of the State 
Road Commission. There was some discussion at that 
time concerning signals. However, plaintiff's testimony 
is undisputed that he was not present at the time of 
any discussion concerning the location of the newsmen 
at the time of the blast. Plaintiff testified that he ar-
rived on U.S. Highway 40, parked his car, and was 
given a ride by a fellow newsman, Dave N ovelle, to 
the area where Mike Miller and Jeff Jordan had already 
parked the car and were setting up the equipment. (R. 
252, 253). 
Plaintiff testified that as soon as he arrived, he 
made inquiry from Miller and Jordan if this was where 
they were going to set up to film the blast and if it was 
safe, to which he received the reply that they were 
going to film the blast from this position and that 
4 
they had been told it was safe. ( R. 253). Plaintiff, 
Jordan, and Miller all testified that the other news-
man, Dave N ovelle, left this area and apparently went 
up to Highway 40. 
The three newsmen then proceeded to set up their 
equipment and to look about to find out where the 
signal for the blast would come from so that they could 
be ready to start filming. They testified as to their 
positions about the automobiles as shown on the dia-
gram, (Ex. P-2), plaintiff at the northwest corner of 
the station wagon, Miller at the right-hand door of 
the station wagon with the door open, and Jordan in 
an open area to the south and west of the station wagon. 
( R. 201, 202, 232, 254, 255). They testified that they 
did not see any signal and that the blast came as a 
surprise; that rocks and debris were thrown past their 
position and that one rock shattered the windshield of 
the station wagon. ( R. 203, 204). Plaintiff testified 
that his arms 'vere propped on the top of the station 
wagon ready to film the blast when it occurred. (R. 
258) . He did hear a voice in the distance but did not 
k11ow what the voice said. (R. 258). He stated that 
he attempted to take cover behind the station wagon 
but that his left wrist was hit by a rock before he could 
<lo this. ( R. 258). 
The evidence was conflicting as to what the news-
men were told would be the signal for the blast. Miller 
an<l .Jordan claimed that they were told that it would 
be the waving of a red flag and three blasts of a whistle. 
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However, witnesses for the defendant denied that 
whistles were to be used and claimed that it would be 
an arm and voice signal relayed back and forth between 
the powder foreman and the detonator. The powder 
foreman, George Anderson, testified concerning the 
conference with the newsmen in the area of the shack, 
stating that Jordan and Miller were from 40 to 60 feet 
away from him at the time when he was giving these in-
structions generally to all. (R. 357). Anderson claimed 
that he informed Jordan and .Miller that they were not 
1 
in a safe place, and he volunteered to take them with him 
up to the highway where they would be safe and be 
able to get some good pictures, but that they refused 
and stated that they would take their chances and get 1 
behind the cars. ( R. 349) . 
Concerning the testimony of the powder foreman, 
George Anderson, and in view of the fact that his testi-
mony is crucial concerning the question as to the 
knowledge of defendant S. S. Mullen, Inc., of persons 
in an area of danger at the time of the blasting opera- , 
tion, it is deemed helpful to quote testimony of Ander-
son both in his deposition and on direct and cross-exami-
nation. 
First, concerning Anderson's know ledge as to 
whether or not the newsmen were in a safe area: (Dep. 
18, 19, 22, 31). 
"A Well, we made sure that everything was 
wired up and we made sure we loaded heavy ' 
enough to bring it down. 'Ve made sure we 
had out flagman out and the traffic was 
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stopped and everybody we figured was in 
~afety except them two guys standing out 
m the open. I have no authority to force them 
off the job." (Dep. 18, 19). 
* * * 
"Q Then at the time that you gave the signal 
you saw that these newsmen were standing 
behind the car and-
A Not behind. Off to the side of it here. 
Q Were they in what you might call an ex-
posed position? 
A That's right. 
Q And you nevertheless gave the signal to fire? 
A That's right." (Dep. 22). 
* * * 
"Q You wouldn't have stood by that car? 
A No, I wouldn't, and if I wouldn't stand by 
it, nobody else has got any business standing 
by it." (Dep. 31). 
Next, concerning certain testimony about Ander-
son's knowledge of the funneling effect of the debris 
down the canyon from the way in which the shots were 
delayed: (Dep. 8, 23, 24, 26). 
''A * * * They said, ''¥ e will be safe here. '" e 
can get behind the car. I said "That car ain't 
going to do you much good if something 
comes down here.' I said, 'It's delayed.' 
They said, ''Ve'll stay right here.' " (Dep. 
8). 
* * * 
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"Q How about the area down here where the 
newsmen were? 
A It was delayed down the canyon, and I told 
them it wasn't safe. 
Q It was what? 
A The ground shots were delayed down the 
canyon toward them. 
Q 'V ell, what do you mean by that? 
A I mean that you used delays, I, 2, 3, 4. The 
I's go first, the milliseconds, twenty-five 
milliseconds between each delay. 
Q What does that have to do with the safety 
of that position? 
A 'V ell, if you were going to-you want that 
to go that way you will put your I's out 
here in this row, 2's in this row back here, 
3's back here and son on. So this here No. 1 
goes first, 2, and then your 3's and so on. 
MR. MARTINEAU: So that material and 
debris will go in the direction of the first 
charges, right? 
THE WITNESS: That's right. They go first. 
Q (By Mr. Black) What you are telling me, 
then, is you had the charges so fixed that the 
westernmost charges would go first? 
A Yes. 
Q And as a result all of the debris would be 
blown due west? 
A The majority of it would go due west which 
didn't go straight up. 
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Q And as I understand it due west is down 
sort of a canyon area? 
A Down in the canyon where we was building 
the new road down in the bottom of the 
canyon. 
Q So in effect that situation would sort of con-
centrate and create kind of a funnel where 
all of the shot would go? 
A That's right. 
Q And you were well aware of this situation? 
A That's right." (Dep. 23, 24). 
* * * 
"Q Did you tell them why it was unsafe? 
A I told them the concrete would fly. 
Q Did you tell them why it would fly in that 
direction? 
Q Because it's going to go to the least resist-
ance. 
Q Did you tell them it was going to be all fun-
neled down that canyon? 
A I told them we were shooting toward the 
canyon." (Dep. 26). 
Since Anderson was available at the time of trial 
and testified, the deposition was not used as originally 
planned, and Anderson testified concerning these items 
on direct examination as follows ( R. 349, 351) : 
"Q Did you feel that they would be safe if they 
were behind the cars? 
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A Yes. If they were behind the cars, I thou(J'ht 
they would be safe." (R. 349). 
0 
* * * 
"Q At the time you signalled to Noe, was there 
any one in a position of danger as far as 
you could tell down below you? 
A No. 
Q What about the newsmen? 
A If they stayed behind their cars they would 
have been safe, I figure." (R. 351). 
And on cross-examination as follows (R. 354, 355, 
356,359-363,367, 368): 
"Q Now, Mr. Anderson, at the time that the 
deposition was taken, you didn't think at 
that time that these newsmen would have 
been safe behind the car, did you? 
A Oh, I didn't think they would be in too much 
danger. No place is safe when they are 
shooting concrete. 
Q My question on page 25: 
'Did you tell them that that would be 
all right behind the car? 
A No, I didn't. I says, "You are on your 
own, then. If you won't move, I can't 
move you.' " 
A That's right. 
Q And you didn't know whether they would be 
safe behind that car, did you? 
A I figured they would be safe. I didn't know; 
nobody knows. 
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Q Now at the time we took the deposition, Mr. 
Anderson, didn't you tell me that this charge 
had been set up in such a way that the force 
of the debris flying would be concentrate:d 
to the west and funneled down that canyon? 
A Down to the ground from the top. The 
bottom would be shot out and the top would 
be delayed over. 
Q You told me it would be delayed. 
A Not funneled, so it would come down the 
canyon there and fall off the piers under-
neath it." (R. 354). 
* * * 
"Q All right. I am looking at page 24, my ques-
tion, 
'And as I understand it due west is down 
sort of a canyon area? 
A Down the canyon where we was build-
ing the new road down in the bottom 
of the canyon. 
Q So in effect that situation would sort 
of concentrate and create kind of a 
funnel where all of the shot would go? 
A That's right. 
Q And you were well aware of this situ-
ation? 
A That's right. 
'¥ere those your answers to the questions 
at that time 
A That's right. That's right. 
Q Now, Mr. Anderson, at the very time that 
11 
you gave the signal for that shot, you knew 
that these men were in an area of danger, 
didn't you? 
A Not if they stayed behind their cars. 
Q I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about 
the time you gave the signal, you knew they 
were in an area of danger, didn't you? 
A No, I didn't know there was an area of 
danger. There is a danger any time you 
shoot anything. There is a danger within 
that two or three thousand yards. You have 
no control when it goes. 
Q Didn't you tell me in this deposition you 
knew they were in an area of danger when 
you gave the signal? 
A No, I didn't tell you they were in a danger-
ous area. 
Q Do you deny it? 
A No, I don't deny it. I don't remember telling 
you. 
Q Page 26: 
'Q Then as I understand it, you went 
ahead and made that shot knowing 
that these two men were still there 
in a position that you thought was 
unsafe? 
A Yes. They said they would get behind 
the car. 
Q As far as you were concerned it was 
their own risk? 
A That's right.' 
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A That's right. They wouldn't come out, so 
they took their own chances." (R. 355, 
356). 
* * * 
" * * * Now you testified at the time of 
the deposition that you told these men that 
-that this debris would be funneled down 
the canyon, didn't you? 
A I told these men? 
Q Yes. 
A No, not that I remember telling them. 
Q All right, page-page 26, line 21: 
'Q As far as you were concerned it was 
their own risk? 
A That's right. 
Q Did you tell them why it was unsafe? 
A I told them the concrete would fly. 
Q Did you tell them why it would fly that 
direction? 
A Because it's going to go to the least 
resistance. 
Q Did you tell them it was going to be 
all funneled down canyon? 
A A told them we were shooting toward 
the canyon.' 
A But I didn't say-
Q Were those your answers to these questions 
at that time? 
A Yes." (R. 359, 360). 
* * * 
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"Q (By Mr. Black) Now I believe you have 
testified in response to Mr. .M:artineau's 
questions that you figured that these men 
would be safe if they got behind that car· 
is that right? ' 
A That's right. 
Q Would you have been - would you have 
stayed in that position behind the car? 
A ~ell, I was-if I was going to do the shoot-
mg-yes. 
Q Your answer is, you would? 
A I would if I was going to do the shooting. 
As a spectator no. 
Q Can you tell me the difference? 
A The difference is, if I am shooting, I 
get down on the ground; and as a spectator, 
I would get to where I felt myself was safe 
and told where it was safe. 
Q Did you tell these men to get down on the 
ground? 
A No, I didn't. 
Q You anticipated, did you not, these men 
would have to get some kind of a view of 
that bridge in order to accomplish the things 
they were there for? 
A That's why I wanted to take them up on 
the highway. 
Q My question was, you knew they had to look 
at the thing they had to photograph? 
A I never cared whether they got pictures. I 
wasn't interested in the pictures they got. 
14 
Q I am not asking what you were interested 
in. You knew they were up there and they 
would have to look at what they saw, didn't 
you? 
A If they get any pictures, they generally do. 
Q Now on page 31 of this deposition, line 13: 
'Q You wouldn't have stood by that car? 
A No I wouldn't, and if I wouldn't stand 
by it, nobody else has got any business 
standing by it.' 
A That's right. I would have laid down on 
the ground. 
Q Were those your answers to those questions? 
A That's right." (R. 360, 361). 
* * * 
"Q (Mr. Black) Now on this business of 
whether or not these charges-this charge 
was directed by this delayed procedure-
we have gone into this before and I want to 
call your attention to page 23 of the depo-
sition. I'm asking you about the area where 
the newsmen were. 
'A It was delayed'-
This is line 8. 
'A It was delayed down the canyon, and I 
told them it wasn't safe. 
Q It was what? 
A The ground shots were delayed down 
the canyon toward them. 
Q Well, what do you mean by that? 
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A I mean that you used delays: 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5. The l's go first, the milliseconds, 
twenty-five milliseconds between each 
delay. 
Q What does that have to do with the 
safety of that position? 
A Well, if you were going to-you want 
that way, you will put your l's out 
here in this row, 2's in this row back 
here, 3's back here and so on, so this 
here No. 1 goes first, 2, and then your 
3's and so on. 
Question by me at line 26: 
'What you are telling me, then, is you had 
the charges so fixed that the westernmost 
charges would go first? 
A Yes. 
Q. And as a result all of the debris would 
be blown due west? 
A The majority of it would go due west 
which didn't go straight up. 
Q And as I understand it, due west is 
down sort of a canyon area? 
A Down the canyon where we was build-
ing the new road, down in the bottom 
of the canyon. 
Q So in effect that situation would sort 
of concentrate and create kind of a 
funnel where all of the shot would go? 
A That's right. 
Q And you were well aware of this situ-
ation? 
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A That's right.' 
'Vere those your answers to those questions? 
A Thats' right. 
Q And are those your answers to those ques-
tions today? 
A On them delays, I would like to explain it. 
Q All right. Are these your answers to these 
questions today? 
A That's right." (R. 361-363). 
* * * 
Q Mr. Anderson, we talked at some length 
where these men were at the time that you 
gave the signal for the shot, and I refer you 
to page 22 of this deposition, line 4: 
'Q Then at the time that you gave the 
signal you saw that these newsmen 
were standing behind the car and-
A Not behind. Off to the side of it here. 
Q Were they in what you might call an 
exposed position 1 
A That's right. 
Q And you nevertheless gave the signal 
to fire? 
A That's right. 
Now were those your answers to those ques-
tions? 'i\T ould you read that? Go ahead. 
(Whereupon a document was handed to 
the witness) . 
A They weren't off-off behind it. They were 
17 
off to kind of the side of the car. It was 
parked, and it was kind of to the side of the 
car. 
Q All right, now, do you want to change your 
testimony today to say that they were in 
an exposed position? Is that what you want 
to do, or do you want to stand on this depo-
sition? (Indicating). 
A 'Vell, they weren't in any exposed position 
when I shot, because they were standing 
off to the side of the car there. (Indicating). 
Q Well, you are-
A The car was between them and the shot. 
c Q w 1~J . h . h 11 d ere m w at you m1g t ca an expose 
position? 
A That's right.' 
Do you want to change that answer? 
A No, I don't want to change it. 
Q All right. Now-and again talking about 
whether or not you thought they were in a 
safe position, at page 18 at the bottom: 
'A-' 
You are talking about what you generally 
did-what precautions you made. 
'A Well, we made sure that everything 
was wired up and we made sure we 
loaded heavy enough to bring it down. 
We made sure we had out flagmen out 
and the traffic was stopped, and eyery· 
body, we figured, was in safety except 
them two guys standing out in the 
18 
open. I have no authority to force 
them off the job.' 
Q Was that your answer at that time? 
A That's right. I have no authority to move 
them off, and I told them that. 
Q I am talking about the entire answer. 
A That's right." (R. 367, 368). 
Plaintiff's contention is that from the above testi-
mony of Anderson in his deposition, direct and cross-
examina tion, all reasonable men would agree that 
Anderson knew that the three newsmen were in an area 
of danger at the very time that he gave the signal to 
detonate the blast. 
The area of dispute as to where the newsmen were 
located at the time of the blast can be seen on defend-
ant's Exhibit C, which indicates a cross for the position 
of the shack, a triangle for the position where Anderson 
and other witnesses for defendant claim that the cars 
were, and the two squares showing where the plaintiff's 
witnesses claim that the two cars were at the time of 
the blast. The X with the circle around it is where 
Anderson claims that he was at the time he gave the 
signal for the blast. The square at the head of the culvert 
is the location of defendant's witnesses Deaton and 
Powis at the time of the blast, both having testified 
that at the time of the blast they retreated into the 
mouth of the pipe. The witness J unger, who was in 
charge of the operation for S. S. Mullen, Inc., testified 
that he had the cars stopped from 800 to 1,000 feet east 
19 
of Stillman Bridge on U. S. Highway 40, (R. 315) 
and approximately a quarter of a mile to the west of 
the bridge. ( R. 322, 323). 
Plaintiff testified that with the camera equipment 
that he used, he could have moved 150 to 200 yards 
farther from the bridge than he was and still have ob-
tained adequate pictures of the blast. ( R. 304, 305). 
The pretrial order ( R. 33-35), stated in part as 
follows ( R. 34) : 
"THE COURT: Briefly, the undisputed facts 
show that defendant was engaged in the demo-
lition of the Stillman Bridge located at or near 
the mouth of Parley's Canyon. During the course 
of such demolition, the defendant used explosives 
and as a result of said explosives certain rocks 
and debris were broken loose, part of which came 
down upon the plaintiff wherein he received the 
injuries of which he complains. 
"There remains an issue of fact in this case as 
to whether or not this activity took place in a 
remote area. If such activity took place in an area 
not regarded as remote, the rule of absolute lin-
bility of the plaintiff would apply. On the other 
hand, if it is determined that the activity took 
place in an area which is remote, then plaintiff 
is required to prove that the defendant's con-
duct was not that of a reasonable prudent man 
under the circumstances." 
The court submitted the case to the jury on negli· 
gence on the part of defendant in setting off the explo-
sion at a time when defendant should have reasonably 
foreseen that plaintiff might be injured (Instruction 
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No. 19, R. 88) ; contributory negligence in failing to 
keep a proper lookout for dangers in the area reason-
ably to be anticipated; failing to keep a proper lookout 
for his own safety; failing to avoid positioning himself 
in a position of obvious danger; and failing to take 
appropriate action to avoid injury to himself after 
having an opportunity to do so (Instruction No. 20, 
R. 89) ; liability based on a finding that defendant 
should reasonably foresee that others might be injured 
(Instruction No. 22, R. 91) ; and the defense of assump-
tion of risk (Instruction No. 21, R. 90). 
Plaintiff requested a directed verdict on liability 
m his Requested Instruction No. 2 ( R. 44) and by 
motion made at the close of the evidence. ( R. 388-400) . 
Plaintiff requested the case submitted to the jury 
on a directed verdict, or in the alternative on the theory 
of absolute liability if the jury should find that de-
fendant should have reasonably foreseen that others 
might be injured by the use of the dynamite ( R. 45) 
with the allowable def ens es of voluntary assumption 
of risk and contributory wilful or reckless misconduct. 
( R. 4<8, 49) . 
The jury returned a verdict of No Cause of Action 
(R. 98, 99). Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alter-
native for a new trial (R. 103), which was denied. 
(R. 104). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED A DIRECT. 
ED FINDING OF LIABILITY. 
Plaintiff moved the court for a directed verdict on 
liability. This motion should have been granted. 
A. AS A lVIATTER OF LA\V, DEFENDAN'I 
KNEW OF PLAINTIFF'S PRECARIOUS PQ.. 
SITION AT THE TIJHE OF THE BLAST. 
The case of Robison v. Robison (1964) 16 Utah 
2d 2, 394 P.2d 876, has established the law in Utah as 
to the rule of absolute liability in blasting cases. The 
court laid down the following rule at page 4: 
"\Vhether dynamite is such a dangerous in· 
strumentality depends upon the circumstances. 
Used in a crowded city, it of course would be; 
whereas, using it on a remote area where there 
is little or no possibility of injury to others, it 
would not. In doubtful situations between those 
extremes, the problem must be resolved by the 
answer to the question as to whether the user 
should reasonably foresee that others might be 
injured.,, (Italics ours) . 
It can be seen from the above that when the evi-
dence establishes that the person conducting the blast· 
ing knows that there are others who might be injured 
in the area and such others are injured, then liability 
is established. The evidence is such in the case at bar 
that all reasonable men must find that defendant knew 
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that Duane Southwick was in an area of danger. Ac-
cordingly, it must follow that defendant is responsible 
under the rule of absolute liability for the damages 
caused to plaintiff by the blasting operation. At this 
point the burden is thrown on defendant to prove the 
defense of assumption of risk by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
Reviewing the testimony of the powder forema~, 
George Anderson, and using the rule reaffirmed in the 
case of Alvarado v. Tucker, et al., ( 1954) 2 Utah 2d 
16, 268 P.2d 986, that: 
"Testimony of a witness on his direct exami-
nation is no stronger than as modified or left by 
his further examination or by his cross-examina-
tion" 
the court must find as a matter of law that the defendant, 
through its powder foreman, knew that others might 
be injured by the blast. Accordingly, liability is estab-
lished. As shown by the quoted portions of Anderson's 
testimony in his deposition, he volunteered time and 
again that the newsmen were in a position of danger at 
the time that he gave the signal for the blast. In his testi-
mony at trial, he tried to change his testimony, stating 
that he thought they would be safe if they would stay be-
hind the car. Also, he attempted to retreat from his vol-
untary statement in the deposition concerning the fun-
neling effect, which he stated made the area in which the 
newsmen were located that much more dangerous. Ac-
cording to the rule in the Alvarado case, supra, Ander-
son cannot keep changing his testimony to help his em-
ployer. 
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The conclusion is inescapable that he knew of the 
danger to these newsmen at the time that he gaYe the 
signal for the detonation. In such a situation it is error 
for the court to r;fre the question to the jur.IJ as tu 
whether or not defendant should have reasonably fore-
seen that others rnight be injured. 
B. DEFENDANT :FAILED TO PRODUCE 
EYIDENCE OF ASSU.MPTION O:F RISK. 
Assumption of risk being an affirmative defense, 
defendant has the burden of proyiug it by a prepond-
erance of the eyidence. This defendant failed to do. 
The Utah law has been well established that in order 
for the defense of assumption of risk to be applicable, 
the plaintiff must know and appreciate the hazard in-
volved and freely and voluntarily consent to assume it. 
These elements have been clearly set forth in the cases 
of Johnson v. ltlaynard, (1959) 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 
P.2d 884, and Jacques v. Farrimond ( 1963) 14 Utah 
2d 166, 380 P.2d 133. The nature of assumption of risk 
is stated in Restatement of Torts 2d,, par. 496 (b), 
where it is stated in part: 
"The basis of assumption of risk is the plain· 
tiff's consent to accept the risk and look out for 
himself. Therefore he will not be found, in the 
absence of an express agreement which is clearly 
so to be construed, to assume any risk unless he 
has knowledge of its existence. This means that 
he must not onlv be aware of the facts which 
create the dange~, but must also appreciate the 
danger itself and the nature, character and ex· 
tent which make it unreasonable. * * * 
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"The standard to be applied is a subjective 
one, of what the particular plaintiff in fact sees, 
knows, understands and appreciates." 
There was no evidence to justify a finding that 
plaintiff knew and appreciated the risk and voluntarily 
assumed it. The evidence shows that the three newsmen 
were 350 to 400 yards from the site of the blast. The 
evidence is undisputed that plaintiff was not involved 
in any discussions with the powder foreman concerning 
the location of the newsmen. Jordan and Miller denied 
that they told plaintiff anything at all about being in 
an area of danger. There isn't a jot of evidence that 
plaintiff had been given any kind of warning at all, 
either that he was in a position of danger or that the 
c.rplosion was about to take place. The evidence is 
undisputed that this was the first demolition that plain-
tiff had ever covered and that he had no experience 
or training in demolition work. Accordingly, plaintiff 
is in the same position as motorists who were stopped 
some 800 to 1,000 feet to the east of Stillman Bridge 
and a quarter of a mile west of Stillman Bridge to 
wait for the blast. Plaintiff came late to the situs and 
found the newsmen already in position. Certainly plain-
tiff, as a person inexperienced with explosives, could 
assume that the newsmen were out of the area where 
debris and rocks could be expected to fall. Plaintiff 
further testified that he could just as easily have taken 
his pictures from 200 yards farther away, inasmuch as 
he had the camera equipment to do it. Why would 
plaintiff want to risk his life merely to get pictures for 
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the T.V. station{ It can be pointed out that plaintiff 
was not paid flight pay or jump pay for gathering news. 
At any rate, there is no evidence that plaintiff knew 
any more about this blasting operation than any other 
spectator in the area. 
Defendant has the burden of proving assumption 
of risk by a preponderance of the evidence, and a jury 
finding could not be based on mere speculation, con-
jecture, or guesswork. 
C. EVEN IF ASSU1\1PTION OF RISK lVAS 
A JURY QUESTION, PLAINTIFF 'VAS EN-
TITLED TO A DIRECTION OF LIABILITY, 
SUBJECT TO 'l'HE DEFENSE OF ASSUMP-
TION OF RISK. 
The court submitted to the jury both the question 
as to whether defendant should reasonably foresee that 
others might be injured and whether plaintiff was guilty 
of assumption of risk. The jury finding could have 
been based either on finding that defendant should not 
have reasonably foreseen that others might be injured, 
or that plaintiff assumed the risk. 
As has been heretofore pointed out, defendant's 
powder foreman testified that he knew that the men, 
where plaintiff was located, might be injured by the 
blast. Defendant is legally bound by this testimony. 
Accordingly, plaintiff was entitled to have the jury 
directed on this point. Plaintiff was prejudiced by the 
court's failing to do this, for the reason that the jury 
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verdict could have been based on a negative finding as 
to this proposition. 
Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict included 
a motion to direct the jury as to liability under the 
doctrine of absolute liability, even if the court correctly 
felt that assumption of risk was a jury question. A 
motion for a directed verdict is a separate motion to 
each of the questions submitted to the jury. See Giguere 
v. E. D. & A. C. Whiting Co., et al., (Vt. 1935) 107 
Yt. 151, 177 At. 313, 98 A.L.R. 196. Since plaintiff 
was prejudiced by the court's refusal to direct the jury 
on the issue of liability, even if there was a jury ques-
tion on assumption of risk, then plaintiff should be 
entitled to a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN SUBMITTING NEGLIGENCE 
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO 
THE JURY. 
Plaintiff pleaded the doctrine of absolute liability 
in his complaint. He did not plead the theory of negli-
gence. The pretrial order stated that only in the event 
that the court should rule as a matter of law that the 
doctrine of absolute liability did not apply in this case, 
should the theory of negligence be presented to the 
jury. The court failed to follow the pretrial order in 
this regard. Instead, the trial court submitted a hybrid 
conglomeration of negligence and absolute liab~lity 
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theories. Plaintiff should not have been forced to go to 
the jury 011 a theory that he did not plead uor want. 
Plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on the clean-cut , 
issue of liability of a person using a dangerous instru-
mentality on the theory of absolute liability with its 
proper dei'cuses. This the court refused plaintiff. It goes 
without saying that pleadings are entirely useless if a 
party cannot plead and prove his case according to his 
theory. The court in the customary introductory instruc-
tion (R. 77) told the jury in part as follows: 
"The basis of the claim of plaintiff for dam· 
ages is that the defendant was negligent in set· 
ting off the explosion when and as it did, and that 
as a proximate cause of said negligence, the 
injury to plaintiff resulted. * * * In addition to 
defendant's denial of negligence, defendant al· 
leges that the plaintiff, himself, was negligent 
and that his negligence was either the sole proxi· 
mate cause or the contributing proximate cause, 
of the injury to the plaintiff, and that he there· 
fore, in either event, would not be entitled to 
recover.'' 
Compare plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 1 
(R. 43). 
Thus, the court gave plaintiff a burden which plain· 
tiff should not have been saddled with, the burden of 
proving neglect on the part of defendant. The court 
also gave defendant a defense that it was not entitled 
to, the defense of contributory negligence. Throughout 
the entire set of instructions are laced the theories of 
negligence and contributory negligence. Plaintiff sought 
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to avoid having these confusions introduced into the 
case, inasmuch as defendant was using a dangerous 
instrumentality which resulted in injury to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was not required to prove negligence but 
merely that defendant should have reasonably foreseen 
that some one might be injured by the blasting opera-
tion. Opening the door for defendant to confuse the 
case with its claims of contributory negligence and 
imposing upon plaintiff the burden of proving negli-
gence greatly prejudiced plaintiff in this case. Con-
tributory negligence is not a defense to a claim of 
absolute liability against a person using a dangerous 
instrumentality. Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed., par. 60, 
p. 341. Plaintiff sought to go to the jury on the sole 
basis of absolute liability, and this the court did not 
allow. Plaintiff should be entitled to a new trial so 
that he can go to the jury on the proper legal theory 
which was pleaded and proved. 
A reference to Instruction No. 20 ( R. 89) can well 
illustrate the type of confusion that was inserted into 
the case by the trial court. Instruction No. 20 reads in 
part as follows: 
"The defendant's claim of negligence on the 
part of plaintiff is based upon the following 
alleged facts: (a) to keep a proper loo~~ut for 
dangers in the area reasonably to be anticipated, 
and (b) keep a proper lookout for his own safety, 
and ( c) avoid positioning himself in ~ place. of 
obvious danger, and (d) take approp~1ate action 
to avoid injury to himself after havmg an op-
portunity to do so. 
29 
"Thus, even if you find the two propositions 
in Instruction No. 19 in favor of the plaintitt, 
he may nevertheless be barred from recovery by 
contributory negligence. * * * " · 
From the above, plaintiff could be barred from 
recovery merely by getting up that morning, going to 
work, and eventually proceeding to the place where he 
attempted to film the demolition. it is stated at 53 Am. 
Jur. "Trial," par. 574, at p. 453: 
"Both the plaintiff and the defendant are 
entitled to have issues of fact presented by the 
pleadings submitted to the jury without the in-
troduction of extraneous matter which may mis-
lead them or divert their minds from a considera-
tion of the evidence pertinent to the real issues. 
No instruction should be given by the court 
either on its own motion or at the request of 
counsel which tenders an issue that is not pre-
sented by the pleadings or supported by the 
evidence, or which deviates therefrom in any ma-
terial respect." 
Maertins v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, a corporation, 
et al., (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 661, 328 P.2d 494, 75 
A.L.R.2d 807, held that it was error to instruct on 
the defense of contributory negligence in a malpractice 
action where this defense was not pleaded: 
"Where a defense is neither raised bv the 
pleadings nor on the trial, it is error to in~trnct 
the jury on it." 
See also: Davis v. Midvale City. 56 Utah l, 189 P. 7-i. 
and Verdi v. Helper State Banlt, 57 Utah 502, 19fi P. 
225. 
30 
Defendant should not have been allowed to inject 
this confusion into this case when plaintiff did not even 
plead negligence. The prejudice to plaintiff is obvious. 
CONCLUSION 
A new trial is required to correct the injustices 
done to plaintiff in the trial of this case. The evidence 
required a finding as a matter of law that defendant 
knew that plaintiff was in an area of danger, and accord-
ingly the jury should have been directed on liability. 
Defendant produced no evidence that plaintiff volun-
tarily assumed a risk of which he knew and appreciated 
the danger. Even if assumption of risk was a jury ques-
tion, plaintiff was prejudiced by having the question 
as to liability submitted to the jury in the face of the 
testimony of defendant's powder foreman admitting 
his knowledge of plaintiff's position in an area of danger 
at the time that he gave the signal for the blast. 
Plaintiff should have been entitled to go to the jury 
on the legal theory which he pleaded, absolute liability. 
The court injected confusion and prejudicial error into 
the case by making a hybrid action out of a clear-cut 
absolute liability action which was pleaded and proved 
br plaintiff. Submitting negligence and contributory 
negligence to the jury and lacing the instructions with 
these theories prejudiced plaintiff. 
Plaintiff should be entitled to a new trial so that 
he can go to the jury on his theory and so that the jury 
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can be properly directed as to a finding of liability. 
In the spirit of the special concurrence in the recent 
case of Cornwell v. Barton, January 24, 1967, the alter-, 
native of a new trial should be favored over a final 
disposition perpetuating the injustices dealt to plaintiff 
in this case. 
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